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Criminal investigation of serious and organized cross-border environmental crimes 
requires effective police cooperation. However, the mounting of coordinated and systematic 
efforts in this field still proves to be difficult. The first explanation for this is the lack of a 
globally applicable legal framework for mutual assistance in criminal matters. Another 
important and often underestimated reason is practical problems regarding the exchange of 
information about detected cross-border environmental crimes and setting up a coordinated 
criminal investigation in two or more countries in response, as well as with regard to the 
execution of requests for mutual legal assistance. Legal scholars often assume that enhancing 
the legal framework for cross-border police cooperation is the primary solution to the 
problems experienced. Here, I show that practical considerations are just as important for 
effective cooperation in cases of transnational environmental crime. A specific problem is the 
fact that this type of crime regularly involves countries with non-democratic regimes or even 
a non-existent central government, as well as weak law enforcement, both in terms of 
capabilities and integrity, and consequently law enforcement agencies in other countries will 
often be reluctant to seek legal assistance.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental crime is in many ways a cross-border crime. To begin with, illegal 
activities may be transnational in their effect, such as the pollution of air and water. Secondly, 
the ‘business process’ of environmental criminal acts may be international in scope, such as 
the trafficking of hazardous waste from an industrialized nation to a Third World country. 
Another example is the misuse of differences in environmental laws between countries. An 
amount of soil coming from a contaminated building site may be considered polluted in one 
country, whereas it is considered clean in another, for example. A company hired to clean up 
the site may therefore decide to simply export the polluted soil illegally, thereby avoiding a 
costly cleaning operation, and to re-import it for further use once its designation has been 
changed. Thirdly, the persons, or the members of the crime group responsible for the illegal 
activity may be operating in two or more countries. An example is a captain of a ship who 
continuously decides to dump waste, such as bilge water, instead of offering it to a specialized 
harbour facility for processing. Finally, cross-border environmental crime may even take 
place in cyberspace, for example by committing fraud in emission trading schemes. In each of 
these cases, cross-border police cooperation may be necessary to tackle the problem.  
 When talking to police practitioners, one can often hear the complaint that 
international law enforcement cooperation is in many respects “not working.” Of course, 
detectives can often also produce case examples in which they did cooperate successfully with 
foreign counterparts (Fijnaut et al., 2005; Spapens, 2008, 2009). This is not surprising, 
because in practice cross-border law enforcement cooperation comprises many aspects, each 
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involving different actions and parties, which result in specific problems. In this paper, I 
analyze three aspects of operational transnational police cooperation in criminal investigation: 
the detection of cross-border environmental crime, the setting up of a coordinated 
investigation, and the gathering of evidence.  
 The scope of this paper is limited in four respects. Firstly, it will address only criminal 
investigation, and therefore leave aside cooperation problems in cases that are dealt with by 
administrative and other competent public authorities. Secondly, the paper focuses mainly on 
operational police cooperation. Consequently, it will not substantially address non-
operational police cooperation (e.g. joint training, exchange of good practices) and judicial 
cooperation (e.g. extradition, transfer of proceedings, taking the suspects to court). Thirdly, 
the paper is limited to those types of cross-border environmental crimes involving trafficking 
operations, particularly the illegal export of (hazardous) waste and crimes relating to the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). 
Fourthly, I will address only the investigation of cases of cross-border serious and organized 
crime, and therefore leave aside cross-border cooperation in providing assistance to the public 
and in public order policing.1  
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first outlines the legal and organizational 
framework for transnational police cooperation. Then sections 3 through 5 address the three 
different aspects of operational police cooperation mentioned above. Section 6 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2 THE  LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICE COOPERATION 
In cross-border police cooperation in criminal investigation, sovereignty of the 
countries involved is the leading principle (Michalowski & Bitten, 2005). Consequently, a 
well-defined legal framework for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters consisting of a 
patchwork of multilateral and bilateral treaties guides any operational action.
2
 The term 
‘police cooperation’ is in a sense misleading, because the police on many occasions need the 
consent of the competent judicial authorities before it can ask for or provide mutual legal 
assistance. Which institution is competent depends on the type of assistance required and the 
country involved. Within the European Union (EU), the Schengen Implementation 
Convention (1991) allows the police to exchange written information already in their 
possession on its own authority.3 This use of this so-called “police-police” information is 
restricted to investigative purposes and cannot be used before the court without the consent of 
the competent judicial authorities.  In any case, application of a special investigative method, 
for instance a request for wiretapping based on the Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU (2000), would require the consent of 
the public prosecution service or an investigative magistrate, for example.
4
  
 If a non-EU Member State makes the request, a decision on the exchange of even the 
simplest piece of “police-police” information may fall to the national authorities, such as the 
Ministry of Justice, unless specific conventions apply. The Netherlands, for instance, has 
signed bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance with a variety of countries, such as the 
United States, Australia and Surinam (Spapens, 2010b). A basic level of trust in each other’s 
legal system is of course a prerequisite for such treaties.  







 Conventions on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters contain general provisions 
on how and under what conditions the competent authorities will provide assistance, on the 
one hand, and articles on specific investigative methods on the other. The European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, drawn up in the context of the Council 
of Europe (COE) in 1959, contains for example provisions for the exchange of rogatory letters 
in general, and allows for the request of interrogation of suspects, the searching of premises, 
the exchange of criminal records and the hearing of witnesses and experts in particular.5 Many 
other treaties follow these basic provisions.  
  If a convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters or a provision allowing 
for a specific action is lacking, however, operational police cooperation is not impossible. In 
such cases, national authorities may decide bilaterally upon the actions needed (Spapens, 
2009). Of course, agreeing upon such case-by-case arrangements will take more time.  
 The main instrument for providing mutual legal assistance is what is termed a rogatory 
letter, or request for mutual legal assistance. Such a request must usually be submitted in 
writing and must explain the nature of the criminal investigation, the identity of the suspects 
(if these are known) and their involvement in the illegal activities, the assistance required, as 
well as the relevant articles of the penal law applicable to the crimes under investigation. A 
requested party may refuse to comply with the request for a number of different reasons 
(Joutsen, 2005). An important aspect is that the crimes must be punishable by law in both the 
requesting and the requested country, although there are sometimes exceptions to this rule. 
Another noteworthy element is the fact that the competent authorities may also deny 
assistance when they consider the other party’s integrity to be insufficient. An example may 
be that the regime is non-democratic. This ground for refusal is particularly relevant in cases 
of cross-border environmental crime, because the illegal activities often involve countries 
with regimes of questionable integrity or with weak regulatory and enforcement systems 
(Elliot, 2009; White, 2010).  
 Because conventions on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters depend on a basic 
level of trust in legal systems, it comes as no surprise that few of these are both 
comprehensive on a global scale and applicable to cases of environmental crime. The only 
real exception is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(2000), now signed by 147 countries.
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 Two other examples of multilateral treaties signed by a 
relatively large number of nations are the aforementioned 1959 Convention, and the 
Commonwealth Scheme for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (or Harare Scheme), 
including 48 and 53 states, respectively. 7  
These three conventions contain comparable provisions for mutual legal assistance. 
The major difference between the UN Convention and the other two, however, is the fact that 
the first applies only to serious and transnational crimes, involving a criminal group. The UN 
defines serious crime as a conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. An organized criminal 
group is defined as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit.” Understandably, these requirements limit applicability of 






the UN Convention to cases of environmental crime, particularly because the penalties 
imposed on those crimes are often minimal (Elliot, 2009, p. 75). 
 Consequently, investigative authorities are often required to fall back on bilateral 
treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters and, if these are unavailable, on case-by-case 
arrangements. The advantage of the latter type of agreements is that two states may bilaterally 
agree upon any type of police action as long as it is not in violation of meta-conventions such 
as the European Convention on Human Rights. The main downside of the latter type of 
agreements it that the decision-making process is usually slow and the outcomes may differ in 
otherwise largely comparable situations.  
 Finally, it should be noted that an organizational framework for cross-border police 
cooperation, for the exchange of rogatory letters and for the coordination of investigative 
actions, is in place. INTERPOL, with now 188 Member States worldwide, is one institution 
and the most well known. The modern INTERPOL was re-build in 1946 after World War II, 
and one of its important tasks is maintaining a network of national bureaus for the secure 
exchange of information on a 24/7 basis.
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 In addition, INTERPOL provides data services, 
maintains databases of police information and offers operational support to national and 
international investigations through its specialized crime units and 24/7 command and 
coordination centre. However, contrary to what the public may think, INTERPOL itself has 
no operational investigative powers. 
 Now that I have outlined the basic framework for police cooperation, I will turn to 
practical cooperation in cross-border criminal investigation cases. The first requirement for 
police cooperation that will be addressed is the detection of transnational environmental 
crime, followed by the exchange of information and intelligence with one or more of the other 
countries in which the criminal business process takes place. 
 
3 DETECTION OF CROSS-BORDER ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 
Obviously, a case of cross-border environmental crime involves illegal activities in 
more than one country. It is, however, less obvious that law enforcement officials who detect 
such an illegal activity immediately share it with their counterparts in countries for which it is 
also relevant. In this section, I will first outline the principal lines by which the police acquire 
information about cross-border serious and organized crime. Next, I will turn to the question 
of how and when such information may be shared with the competent authorities of a foreign 
country.  
 In general, the police will detect transnational environmental crime either reactively or 
proactively. The first implies that the police spontaneously receive a report of a crime. A 
civilian may report the discovery of a dumping site of hazardous waste, for example. Another 
government agency, such as the Customs, may also detect an environmental crime, following 
a scheduled control for example, and then inform the police. In a case of transnational 
environmental crime, the police of country A may start a criminal investigation and then seek 
assistance of the police in country B. It is, of course, also possible that the police share 
information about ongoing cross-border environmental crime with foreign counterparts 
beforehand, in order to mount a coordinated investigation from the start.   
 Next, the police may detect crimes proactively. In such cases, the police actively seek 
information about environmental crime for the purpose of starting an investigation. Firstly, 
the police – often together with other government bodies – may gather information by means 
of controls, for example of commercial vehicles, trains and ships transporting waste to a 




destination abroad. The legal framework on police cooperation in the European Union also 
allows for joint controls by police officers of two or more Member States. A second option is 
to use informers in criminal circles who can provide intelligence about ongoing crimes and 
the persons involved. Another approach is to systematically bring together and analyze 
information on a specific problem already possessed by enforcement agencies.9 Systematic 
analysis of companies in a particular sector, such as asbestos disposal, may also render 
enough suspicions of criminal activities to justify further investigation.  
 In most cases, an enforcement agency of one country will be the first to detect a case 
of cross-border environmental crime. The focal question therefore is how the authorities of 
other jurisdictions to which the illegal activities are relevant are to receive the necessary 
information.  
 Firstly, the police of the country in which the illegal activities are first detected may 
start a criminal investigation during which legal assistance is sought from one or more of the 
other countries involved. A rogatory letter or a “police-police” message informs the 
authorities and requests specific investigative actions that may render additional information. 
The authorities may also use the information as a starting point for their own more 
comprehensive investigation, or use it as part of a broader analysis. In practice, this is the 
most common trajectory through which foreign authorities receive notice about a cross-border 
illegal activity yet undetected by themselves.  
 The next option, however, is that the police of the country in which the case of 
environmental crime is first detected will start an investigation, but limit it to the crimes 
committed within their own national jurisdiction. In such cases, foreign authorities may not be 
informed at all, or only after completion of the case. Particularly in trafficking operations, the 
illegal activity is usually ‘glocal.’ A criminal group in one country produces the goods, for 
example, and transports these to another country where another group sells the shipment in 
smaller parts, or takes care of further working up. Apart from contacts between a few key 
persons who negotiate the deal, there are usually few links between the persons involved. A 
good example of a glocal operation is a case of trafficking of e-waste from the Netherlands to 
Ghana, the Czech Republic and Ukraine (Mostert et al., 2010).  
 By concentrating on the illegal activities close to home, the investigative authorities 
reduce the risk of premature leaks, particularly if they question the integrity of the regime and 
the law enforcement agencies of the other countries involved. Moreover, the police and the 
judiciary also avoid the complications that may follow from asking for mutual legal 
assistance, such as the extra work involved in writing rogatory letters, and the costs of 
travelling abroad to confer with foreign officials.  
  Finally, the competent authorities of the country that first detects the case may decide 
not to mount an investigation. One reason may be that the level of suspicion required by the 
Code of Criminal Procedure is insufficient to commence proceedings. Another may be that 
limited resources of personnel and equipment are required for the investigation of other more 
pressing crime problems. Within the EU, for example, the legal framework would allow for 
informing another Member State.
10
 In practice, however, this is still far from common, even 
in border areas where serious and organized crime is highly interwoven across the area 
(Spapens, 2008). One of the problems is that detectives do not know to which agency they 
should send the information, and do not have (or take) the time to enquire. Another problem is 
that the sharing of this type of yet uncorroborated knowledge, particularly if it concerns 





intelligence provided by criminal informers, requires a high level of trust in the integrity and 
the working methods of foreign counterparts. Usually, law enforcement officials will choose a 
better safe than sorry approach towards the risk of leaks. In practice therefore, the exchange of 
this type of information largely depends on previous cross-border investigation cases in which 
cooperation was successful and on the personal relations developed on those occasions. One 
example is a case in which a Spanish-speaking Dutch police officer was sent to Spain to act as 
a liaison in a cross-border investigation. During his posting, he developed close personal 
relations with his Spanish colleagues who kept notifying him of any information they came 
across that might be relevant for the Netherlands (Spapens, 2006).  
  From the above, however, it is clear that the active and systematic sharing of 
information about cross-border organized crime is still haphazard at best. An international 
criminal investigation is seldom set up as a coordinated effort from the beginning. Instead, 
relevant information is often not exchanged at all, or exchanged too late to put it to good use 
immediately. These problems are a huge frustration to law enforcement officials and largely 
explain their criticism of the quality of operational police cooperation.   
 Recent international operations initiated and coordinated by the INTERPOL 
Environmental Crime Programme, identified areas where future operations may be improved. 
Recommendations focus on  greater participation in future operations, more frequent use of 
modern operational means of communication, the need of coordinated national operational 
plans, more uniformed standards of reporting,  enhanced intelligence exchange  including the 
efficient use of secure systems and official portals and the expansion of international analysis 
capacity (INTERPOL 2011a and 2011b). 
 
4 SETTING UP A CROSS-BORDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION  
The next phase in operational police cooperation is to make available the personnel 
and equipment needed to comply with a request, if it is deemed admissible. A rogatory letter 
may range from a relatively simple request for a particular investigative action or a piece of 
information, to a request for mounting a comprehensive investigation in a coordinated effort. 
Especially the latter may lead to intense discussion, often before any official requests for 
mutual legal assistance have been exchanged (Fijnaut, et al., 2005).  
In practice, relatively simple requests for mutual legal assistance comprise the bulk of 
all rogatory letters (Fijnaut et al., 2005, Van Daele et al., 2008). Even in large-scale criminal 
investigation cases, the assistance asked of the foreign police will usually be limited to 
specific actions. An evaluation of requests for mutual legal assistance received in 2001 in two 
districts of the public prosecution service in the Netherlands, revealed that most of the 
rogatory letters concerned interrogation of a suspect (31%), the hearing of a witness (12%), 
identification of a person’s whereabouts (14%) and the identification of a telephone number 
(6%) (Fijnaut et al., 2005, p. 110). In such cases, one or more police officers will be charged 
with executing the request as a part of their daily routine and therefore requires no specific 
effort.  
However, requests for mutual legal assistance may also be complicated and require 
further investigation by a team of detectives operating in close cooperation with their foreign 
counterparts over a considerable period (Spapens, 2009). In such cases, single actions will 
often not suffice and a team of detectives will need to conduct a proper investigation. The 
aforementioned study showed that 3% of the rogatory letters received asked for a more 
thorough investigation and the application of different investigative methods (Fijnaut et al., 
2005, p. 111). In such cases, practical difficulties occur more often.  
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To begin with, resources for criminal investigations are scarce, and usually all 
available personnel are already tied up in ongoing cases. It is therefore not easy to start an 
investigation at the same time in two or more countries. More importantly, scarcity of 
personnel and equipment implies that investigative priorities need to be set and every 
sovereign country follows its own policy in this respect. Consequently, policy makers in one 
country may consider a specific type of environmental crime a high investigative priority, 
whereas their counterparts in another state may see it as a less pressing problem. These 
counterparts will therefore be less inclined to commit resources to an investigation. Studies of 
police cooperation in the Dutch-Belgian-German border area, for example, revealed that 
differences in investigative priorities are usually the main explanation why coordinated 
investigations will not materialize (Spapens, 2008, 2009). Belgium and the Netherlands both 
apply the principle of opportunity, for example, but set different priorities for criminal 
investigation. Property crime is a high priority in Belgium for instance, because the country 
has a specific problem with Eastern European itinerant gangs, whereas in the Netherlands it is 
not. In Germany, the principle of legality applies, which obliges the police to investigate any 
crime brought to its attention. Therefore, the German police have less room for manoeuvre 
whenever information about a crime is received reactively (Van Daele & Van Geebergen, 
2007).  
Clearly, if it is already difficult to coordinate investigative efforts even in a densely 
populated border area of three EU Member States, such problems multiply when social and 
cultural distances increase. If the Dutch police and judicial authorities intend to start an 
investigation on the import of illegally logged wood, for example, it will be extremely 
difficult to coordinate the effort from the start with the investigative authorities in the distant 
countries where the harvesting takes place. Which authorities are competent? Can they be 
trusted? Will they participate in a coordinated investigation? Do they have the personnel and 
equipment available needed to investigate the case effectively?  
 
5 GATHERING EVIDENCE  
If a relevant convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters applies, the request 
meets the conditions set, and the competent authorities have successfully settled discussion 
about mounting an investigation with regard to a specific crime group or illegal activity, 
practical work can begin in order to obtain the necessary evidence.  
 As I have described in the previous section, one or more police officers will usually 
deal with the task of executing a simple request for mutual legal assistance. An example is a 
Belgian request to the Netherlands for the interrogation of a Dutch suspect who delivered a 
ship to a Belgian shipyard for demolition, without mentioning that it had still about a hundred 
tons of waste oil and bilge water onboard. Another example is a request for further 
information about the owner of a Dutch car that the police found dumped in a German canal. 
Of course, trained police officers will have no problem conducting an interrogation and to 
draw up a verbatim report containing the necessary information for their foreign counterparts, 
for example. Yet, practical problems may still prevent swift compliance.  
 Police officers often see requests for mutual legal assistance as extra work and 
therefore give their execution a relatively low priority. Sometimes it may take months for 
police officers to find the time, particularly if they have little affinity with the topic of the 
investigation, or assume that the required action is not very realistic or will not render 
additional information.  
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 In addition, rogatory letters are not always clear about the exact information the 
foreign authorities need for their investigation. In the end, their report may therefore be 
incomplete, and the requesting party may have to file an additional rogatory letter. 
Furthermore, some legal systems set specific requirements for verbatim reports or evidence 
obtained, which may differ from those familiar to the police officers in the requested country. 
An option for the requesting state is to ask permission for their detectives to be present during 
the interrogation of the suspect or the searching of premises. Although police officers are 
usually not allowed to perform executive actions on foreign territory themselves, they can of 
course help their colleagues in asking the right questions and seizing the objects relevant to 
their investigation, as well as ensuring that all evidence is collected to meet the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of their country. However, such visits are costly in terms of time and 
money, especially when the request refers to a distant country, and are therefore not standard.  
 Finally, even simple requests for mutual legal assistance may require a complex and 
time-consuming administrative path. In the case of the Netherlands, for example, a rogatory 
letter requiring investigative action must first be sent to the public prosecution service. There, 
specialists judge whether the request meets the requirements. If the request originates from 
outside the EU, or concerns actions that do not fall within the legal framework of the 
conventions to which the Netherlands is party, assessment falls to the Ministry of Justice. If 
the request is admissible, the public prosecution service will forward it to a suitable police 
department for execution. If a suspect needs to be interrogated, the request will be sent on to 
the district where this person is residing, for example. A case of cross-border environmental 
crime will usually be forwarded to one of the specialist regional teams responsible for the 
investigation of these types of crime, or to one of the specialized enforcement agencies such 
as the investigation squad of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
After the police have obtained the necessary information or evidence, the public prosecution 
service will once again check if it may be transferred to the requesting foreign party. The 
Code of Criminal Procedure may also enable the suspects involved to appeal. In the 
Netherlands, for example, objects seized by the police could not until recently be transferred 
abroad before an appeal had been dealt with by a court, a procedure that usually took months 
(Fijnaut et al., 2005).  
 In complex cases, the competent authorities may decide to have a team of detectives 
formed to investigate the illegal activities taking place within their own national jurisdiction. 
Usually, such a team will coordinate activities with the investigation team operating in the 
requesting country. Team leaders may for instance meet regularly to exchange information 
and to discuss tactics. An investigation of cross-border organized crime will usually also 
involve the application of special investigative methods, such as surveillance, wiretapping or 
bugging. Successful cooperation often requires intense deliberation and an open attitude from 
police officers and public prosecutors and investigative magistrates towards the specifics of 
their respective working methods as well as national rules and regulations. Using civilians to 
infiltrate criminal groups is quite common in the United States, for example, whereas in the 
Netherlands, the law allows for this only as a last resort and it requires the personal approval 
of the Minister of Justice. On the one hand, the US police must therefore accept that it cannot 
use civilians to infiltrate a criminal group in a case involving the Netherlands. On the other, 
the Dutch police may be able to apply tactics with which their counterparts are less familiar, 
such as large-scale wiretapping (Spapens, 2011). In practice, working together in parallel 
investigations continuously calls for adjustment. An alternative is to set up a joint 
investigation team made up of detectives from the different countries in which investigative 
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action is necessary (Spapens, forthcoming). One advantage of such a team is that its members 
may exchange information directly, which saves time. Another is that one person leads the 
investigation, so there is less need for continuous adjustment.  
 Although there are many snags that may frustrate the timely and adequate execution of 
rogatory letters, or effective cooperation in parallel and joint investigations, practical instead 
of legal constraints usually account for mishaps. If personal relations between the law 
enforcement officials at different levels are good, and as long as (organizational) interests 
converge, legal problems can usually be solved (Spapens, 2008). Network and capacity 
building are therefore also of huge importance. To this, a wide range of institutions can 
contribute, not only in the field of policing and customs, but also in the context of the United 
Nations, CITES, and of (informal) networks such as the Internationl Network for 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) and the European Union Network for 
the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL).  
 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper shows that many difficulties may obstruct cross-border police cooperation 
in cases of transnational environmental crime. On a global scale, the legal framework for 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters is still limited in scope. This is particularly 
important because the trafficking of waste and endangered species of wild flora and fauna, for 
example, often involves both industrialized and Third World countries. The latter countries 
are often not party to the legal framework on mutual assistance in criminal matters, with the 
exception perhaps of treaties concluded in the context of the UN. Moreover, it may already be 
difficult to seek cooperation because of a lack of trust. Clearly, there are neither simple 
solutions to this problem nor quick fixes. To begin with, strengthening mutual trust by 
enhancing non-operational cooperation could be a fruitful starting point from which to move 
on to operational cooperation in criminal investigation. Indeed the police in EU border areas 
followed this same path from the late 1960s onwards. This type of cooperation should not be 
limited to exchanging best practices and network building at seminars though, but should also 
include joint training and, whenever possible, building a technical infrastructure for 
cooperation, for instance to exchange information quickly. INTERPOL already initiated joint 
training programmes in the field of environmental crime, for example. 
 Of course, there is also much to gain as regards police cooperation between the 
industrialized countries. These countries are usually party to conventions on mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters. Therefore, further expansion of the legal framework does not 
seem to be the primary solution to problems in cross-border police cooperation. Instead, we 
should look for practical measures. Here, at least a more rapid exchange of information in the 
case of detection of a cross-border environmental crime is of the utmost importance. In such 
cases, the standard procedure should be the notification of INTERPOL and, in the EU, 
Europol. This would enable these agencies to forward important information to other member 
states. It would also allow INTERPOL and Europol to build up a database for strategic 
analysis, to gain a broader insight into the problems at hand, and to direct future interventions 
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